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Abstract
Due to increasing demands in processing power on the one hand, but the physical limit on CPU clock
speed on the other hand, multi-threaded programming is becoming more important in current applications.
Unfortunately, multi-threaded programs are prone to programming mistakes that result in hard to ﬁnd
defects, mainly race-conditions and deadlocks. The need for tools that help ﬁnding these faults is immanent,
but currently available tools are either diﬃcult to use because of the need for annotations, unable to cope
with more than a few 10 kLOC, or issue too many false warnings. This paper describes experiments with the
freely available tool Helgrind and results obtained by using it for debugging a server application comprising
500 kLOC. We present improvements to the runtime analysis of C++ programs that result in a dramatic
reduction of false warnings.
Keywords: data races, race conditions, debugging, parallel programs, synchronization, multi-threaded
programming, object-oriented programming, static-dynamic co-analysis
1 Introduction
Hardware is becoming more powerful every year. Recent developments have pushed
CPU speeds on the edge of manageable frequencies. Further improvements are only
possible by multiplying the number of CPUs (or CPU cores on one chip). Today’s
software does not beneﬁt from multi-processor machines unless it utilizes multiple
threads. Thus, the need for “multithreading” applications is increasing.
In addition, multi-threading is a powerful paradigm that may help partitioning
programs into logical threads of execution, thereby making interleaved operations
easier to model. But parallel execution introduces possible faults that are diﬃcult
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to detect and localize by conventional debugging techniques. This is due to the un-
predictable and therefore nondeterministic execution order of concurrent programs.
Without proper synchronization two major classes of faults unique to concurrent
execution can be identiﬁed. Data races, where unsynchronized access to shared
memory locations results in inconsistent data, and deadlocks, where two or more
threads block each other, mostly because of cyclic dependencies.
Hence, developers need tools that help in ﬁnding these kind of faults. Proposed
solutions for fault detection in multi-threaded programs include model-checking,
static analysis and runtime analysis.
Model-checking suﬀers from the problem of state space explosion. In spite of
all eﬀorts (e.g. counter example guided abstraction reﬁnement [3]) it is still not
applicable to large programs. Static analysis techniques try to locate possible faults
by applying heuristics to the source code. Detecting all feasible data races by
static analysis is well-known to be an NP-hard problem [11]. Another problem in
the C++ domain is the lack of freely available correct and reliable parsers that
generate suitable abstract representations.
Runtime-methods scale well, but only faults on the path of execution are taken
into account. Hence, detecting all possible data races is impossible. But it is possible
to detect and report all apparent data races on the execution path. An eﬃcient
lock-set based runtime-algorithm called Eraser [14] was implemented in the open-
source tool Valgrind and is thereby available for all Linux-x86 based environments.
Unfortunately, at least for C++ applications, the number of falsely reported possible
data races is too large, making the tool diﬃcult to use since every reported location
has to be checked by hand.
In general, the algorithm is easy to use because it does not require special tuning
or annotations by the programmer. This is making it a perfect tool for every day
use. However, the average programmer will not use a tool that generates hundreds
of spurious warnings that he has to analyze by handsince this is a time consuming
and error-prone task. Hence, it is necessary to reduce the number of false positives
while keeping the original unsupervised reliable behavior. In addition, programmer
written annotations should not be needed.
The solution is to combine both static and runtime analysis, by annotating
the program automatically and transparently to the programmer. The annotation
provides the runtime method with additional knowledge gathered from the structure
of the source code. While these hints reduce reporting of false positives, they are
not necessary. Therefore, it is still possible to analyze programs, where only parts
of the source code are available.
This work presents results from experiments where the Eraser implementation
in the tool Helgrind was applied to an existing network server application. Two
improvements were made: One to better simulate actual hardware behavior (i.e. bus
locking). Another to cope with eﬀects introduced by C++ speciﬁc implementation
issues. This drastically reduces the amount of false positives reported, making the
tool usable for the debugging of large C++ applications. In particular, the amount
of false positives removed by our improvements during our experiments was in the
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range of 65% to 81% of the total number of warnings.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains an overview of runtime
methods for fault detection in multi-threaded programs and presents the runtime
detection implemented in Helgrind in greater detail. In Section 3, we present our
method of source-code annotation in order to make runtime analysis more accurate
and describe the general environment for the experiments. Section 4 contains re-
sults from our experiments. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper with a general
discussion of our results.
2 Fault Detection
In this section, we ﬁrst present some deﬁnitions of faults unique to concurrent
programs. Then an overview of runtime methods for detecting these faults is given.
This is followed by a more detailed description of the algorithms implemented in
the freely available tool Helgrind, which was used as a basis for our experiments.
2.1 Deﬁnitions
Faults that are unique to concurrent programs are data races and deadlocks.
A deadlock is deﬁned as a state, where each thread in a collection of two or
more threads tries to acquire a lock already held by one of the other threads in the
collection. Hence, the threads are blocked on each other in a cyclic manner.
A data race occurs, when two or more concurrent threads access a shared location
which is not protected by a proper synchronization construct (e.g., a monitor) and
at least one of them modiﬁes the contents of the accessed component.
This deﬁnition is a bit restrictive and in fact describes the locking policy en-
forced by the Eraser algorithm. The weakness of the deﬁnition is that the program
can reach an inconsistent state, even if every single access to a shared location is
protected by proper synchronization.
This will become clear in the following example:
Suppose, we have a data structure containing two elements: let us say the date-
of-birth and age of an arbitrary person. The two variables depend on each other
because, the current age of the person could be calculated by counting the time
elapsed from date-of-birth until now. In addition, there is a synchronization object
protecting access to the data. Two setter-methods exist, one to set the date-of-birth
and the other to set the age. Now, when updating the structure we ﬁrst write the
new date of birth followed by a call to set the new value for age. Both methods
use synchronization to protect their ﬁeld accesses. Therefore the rule, that every
single access to the shared location is protected by synchronization, is satisﬁed.
Nevertheless, it is possible to reach an inconsistent state between two write accesses
that depend on each other, because the lock is released in-between.
Even when every single access to a data structure is protected by a lock, it
might be possible to reach an inconsistent state for the data. In [1] this is called a
high-level data race, because the notion of a data race does not seem to be powerful
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enough, In other works [4,15], the problem is tackled by the deﬁnition of atomicity
and atomicity violations.
While usually not resulting in actual faults, the locking strategy itself has an
impact on the performance of the application. At worst, all data are protected
by a single (global) lock, resulting in unnecessary blocking of independent threads.
Generally, heavy usage of a global resource by all threads degrades performance and
drastically reduces the speed-up in multi-processor systems.
2.2 Dynamic Methods
Most dynamic methods are based on the lock-set algorithm Eraser or on Lamport’s
happens-before relation [7].
The algorithm implemented in Eraser [14] tries to identify the locks that guard
a shared location by maintaining a lock-set containing all locks that are active at
each access. Therefore, it is able to detect violations of the locking discipline that
requires each shared location be protected by the same lock (or set of locks) on
every access to it.
A method that was developed to detect data races in the DSM System Millipage
is the algorithm DJIT [6]. It utilizes vector time frames and access logging to check
the happens-before relation between concurrent accesses to a shared location. It
relies on the assumption of an underlying coherent system and detects only the ﬁrst
apparent data race.
The main advantage of the lock-set algorithm is the ability to detect all possible
data races that exist on the execution path. On the other hand, it sometimes gives
too many false detections. DJIT tries to locate only apparent data races. Hence,
it detects data races on a subset of shared locations that are reported by the lock-
set approach and misses some real data races. Therefore, Multi-Race [13] tries
to improve the data race detection capabilities by combining enhanced versions of
Lock-set and DJIT into a common framework.
In [12] the authors combine a lock-set based data race detector with a vector
clock based happens-before relation check on Java synchronization primitives. Ac-
tions on these primitives are viewed as events that impose an order on memory
accesses between them. Unfortunately, neither their assumption that unsynchro-
nized memory writes become visible in causal order is true on all SMP systems, nor
is the relation between signal and wait operations on conditions strong enough to
impose the assumed order.
A major disadvantage of online techniques is that they slow down the execution
of the application under observation signiﬁcantly. Consequently, their use requires
adaption of the environment to support slower reactions. Principally, on-the-ﬂy
checkers can work post mortem amd hence reduce the performance impact due to
the online calculations. But they still need logging of the execution trace. Hence,
oﬄine techniques suﬀer from their need for large amount of data.
Nevertheless, on-the-ﬂy checkers scale well with program size. They are not
complete as only faults on the execution path are found, but already in use in
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industrial software development. One implementation is the freely available tool
Helgrind. We used it as a base for our experiments and the underlying algorithm is
described in the following section.
2.3 Runtime Analysis
2.3.1 Helgrind
Helgrind is a Valgrind tool [10,9] for detecting data races in C and C++ programs.
It uses the Eraser algorithm [14] and improvements from Visual Threads [5] in order
to reduce reporting of false positives.
Valgrind is a binary instrumentation framework for Linux ELF Binaries and
was at ﬁrst used as a memory checker. Starting with version 2 the application
was divided into a core that generates intermediate code from an executable binary
and interprets the code using just-in-time compilation for speed improvements, and
a skin or tool that instruments the intermediate code before it is executed and
interprets the results.
This makes Valgrind a powerful and ﬂexible tool for all kinds of runtime checking.
In order to suppress false reportings in subsequent runs of the checker, it is
possible to write a so-called suppression-ﬁle that contains report-type and call-stack-
patterns of locations that are false positives or part of code that is not modiﬁable
(e.g., third-party libraries).
2.3.2 Basic Algorithm (Eraser)
Eraser [14] is an algorithm that checks a given program whether each access to a
shared memory location is protected by proper synchronization. In this implemen-
tation it works only for programs that use the POSIX-Threads library, because calls
to that library are intercepted in order to track the status of the memory and the
thread system.
The basic synchronization object in POSIX-Threads is a mutex (mutual
exclusion), with methods to acquire (lock) and release (unlock) it. Only one thread
can hold a lock at any given time. All other threads that try to lock it are blocked
until the mutex is released again.
In order to avoid the need for annotations, the Eraser algorithm tries to infer the
mutex that protects a shared memory location, and if the location is unprotected
issues a warning. A set is maintained for every shared memory location, which
contains the intersection of the sets of locks that were held during all accesses to
the shared memory location.
The basic algorithm in pseudo-code:
Let locks held(t) be the set of locks held by thread t.
For each v, initialize C(v) to the set of all locks.
%%REVIEWER:For each v −> For each variable v
On each access to v by thread t,
set C(v) := C(v) ∩ locks held(t);
if C(v) = {}, then issue warning.
This should ﬁnd all possible data-races, but results in too many false positives.
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Fig. 1. States for a memory location. After being allocated, it starts in state NEW. During initialization
it is owned EXCLUSIVEly by the allocating thread until another thread reads from or writes to the loca-
tion. Then, one of the SHARED states is reached and the lock-set is initialized for consistency checking.
Nevertheless, race conditions are only reported in the SHARED-MODIFIED state.
One major drawback is that initialization and read-shared data is not handled
properly.
Locks are not needed for some shared variables that are initialized once by one
thread and subsequently only read by the other threads.
Therefore, states were introduced in the Eraser algorithm, that enable it to deal
with these situations (cf. Figure 1).
The lock-set is not initialized as long as only one thread uses the memory loca-
tion. When another thread accesses the memory location, the lock-set is initialized
with all active locks and the algorithm reports the next write access that results in
an empty lock-set.
Now, a thread that allocates a memory location, owns it until another thread
accesses the same memory location. Hence, the allocating thread may initialize
the shared variable and then share it with other threads for reading only without
resulting in a warning by the race-detector.
There are cases where the algorithm is now incomplete because of its dependence
on the actual interleaving. A data race occurs when the ﬁrst read access by another
thread occurs before the initialization of the shared memory is complete. It is not
detected by the algorithm, because in the observed interleaving, all writes took
place before the ﬁrst (shared) read access.
According to the authors this drawback is out-weighted by the reduction in
the amount of false positives reported by the modiﬁed algorithm. Repeated tests
with diﬀerent test data (resulting in diﬀerent interleavings) could help ﬁnd such
data-races, if they exist.
An extension for read-write locks that is presented in the original Eraser al-
gorithm is not implemented in Helgrind. Albeit it would be useful in certain
circumstances.
When a variable enters the Shared-Modiﬁed state, checking is as follows:
Let locks held(t) be the set of locks held in any mode by thread t.
Let write locks held(t) be the set of locks held in write mode by thread t.
For each v, initialize C(v) to the set of all locks.
On each read of v by thread t,
set C(v) := C(v) ∩ locks held(t);
if C(v) = {}, then issue warning.
On each write of v by thread t,
set C(v) := C(v) ∩ write locks held(t);
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Fig. 2. A thread consists of thread segments, that are separated by thread-create and -join operations.
Memory accesses that are limited to non-overlapping thread segments are still exclusive even if not done by
a single thread.
if C(v) = {}, then issue warning.
Thread Segments
Another typical scenario that results in a warning is as follows:
A thread allocates memory, initializes it by setting it to something useful and ﬁres
up a second thread, that should work on the data. After a while the ﬁrst thread
waits for the second thread to ﬁnish, before it uses the memory again.
Thus, the memory is shared between threads, but at any time only one thread
accesses it. The ownership is passed onto the second thread until it terminates.
This observation is used by VisualThreads ([5]) to further reduce the number of
false positives by introducing thread segments (cf. Figure 2).
Instead of a thread being owner of a shared variable that is in EXCLUSIVE
state, it is now a thread segment that owns it. Then, whenever another thread
accesses the memory, it is checked whether the thread-segments overlap. If not, the
new thread-segment becomes the new owner instead of the variable switching into
SHARED state.
The modiﬁcation to the Eraser algorithm:
(i) When data d is marked as EXCLUSIVE, associate it with the thread segment
id of the current thread instead of the thread id.
(ii) If data d is marked as EXCLUSIVE to thread segment TSi, and is being
touched by TSj, and TSi happens before TSj in the graph, then instead of
moving the data to one of the shared states, associate d with TSj. The state
remains EXCLUSIVE.
3 Improvements and Experiments
After early experiments with Helgrind we found two improvements that help in
reducing the number of false positives.
3.1 Improvements
First, we corrected the implementation of the hardware bus lock in Helgrind. It was
implemented by using a special mutex that is locked on every explicit invocation
of the LOCK preﬁx. According to Intel’s i386 speciﬁcation read operations do not
require to use the LOCK preﬁx. It is only needed for writes. A correct implementa-
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Fig. 3. Data ﬂow of the debugging process. All or part of the source code is analyzed and instrumented.
The resulting binary is executed on the VM Valgrind with data race detection.
tion is more like a read-write lock. This required the implementation of read-write
locks in Helgrind. The modiﬁed version of the tool internally supports rw-locks. As
a beneﬁt, support for the corresponding POSIX API could be added easily.
Helgrind is able to work without the need of source code. Hence, the detection
process is independent of the programming language. Unfortunately, many of the
analyzed warnings turned out to be caused by C++ speciﬁc code.
When the destructor of an object is called every destructor of its parents classes
is called prior to actually releasing the memory associated with the object. The
destructor of the super-class should only see the properties of its class and therefore
the environment has to be changed in order to reﬂect this change in properties and
virtual method pointers.
This change is done by writing to a location in the object’s memory, hence
resulting in a warning, because Helgrind does not know anything about objects and
destructors and that accesses to an object’s memory in its destructor can not result
in a data race on itself.
Since the number of false positives due to polymorphic object destruction code
is rather large and identifying them by hand is too much work, it is necessary to
suppress them automatically. It is done by annotating every delete operation in the
source code of the program in order to mark deleted memory for the race detection
as exclusively owned by the running thread. That way, accesses by other threads
during destruction are still detected.
Parts of the program where the source code is not available will not beneﬁt
from this annotation therefore still resulting in false positives. However, the overall
number of false reportings is reduced.
The method does not need whole program analysis and is easily integrated into
the build process. The annotation could be inserted into production code because
the user-space call to Helgrind is a no-op under normal program execution with
negligible execution time.
Annotation is done on-the-ﬂy and it is easily removed from the build process,
since the source code is not modiﬁed, neither by the annotation tool nor by the pro-
grammer. The whole process is described in greater detail in the following section.
3.2 Debugging Process
When checking a program using the original Helgrind algorithm, it is not necessary
to compile the source code in a special way. Symbol information is needed for
convenience. Without the debug symbols, Helgrind is not able to print source line
information or the function names on the call stack for locations where a fault is
suspected. To check a program for errors, it can be run unmodiﬁed with Helgrind.
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/∗ Original source code ∗/
void g(char ∗ p)
{
delete p;
}
/∗ Annotated source code ∗/
#include <valgrind/helgrind.h>
namespace {
template <class Type>
inline Type ∗ ca deletor single(Type ∗ object)
{
VALGRIND HG DESTRUCT(object, sizeof(Type));
return object;
}
}
void g(char ∗ p)
{
delete ca deletor single ( p);
}
Fig. 4. An example for the annotation. The argument for operator delete is passed through a function which
announces the memory to be destroyed to the race detector. The macro VALGRIND HG DESTRUCT
expands to a sequence of mnemonics that do nothing under normal execution, but are recognized by the
interpreter of Helgrind as a special function call.
A second step to interpret the results is necessary.
The instrumentation necessary to improve Helgrind requires an additional ﬁrst
step. As shown later, the instrumentation can be done during the build process
without visible modiﬁcations to the source code and, more importantly, without
user interactions, thereby retaining the ease of use of the debugging technique. After
adding automatic source code annotation to the process, the modiﬁed debugging
process consists of three parts (cf. Figure 3).
Instrumentation
All available source code could be instrumented to help reduce false reportings
of the runtime analysis. For now, only delete operators are annotated to mark
the memory of the destructed object as exclusive, destroyed.
For an example of instrumented code, see Figure 4, but note, that it is presented
in a state that does not exist in the real process, because the preprocessing was
omitted for clarity.
The runtime analysis works without source code instrumentation, but the re-
sults are better with instrumentation.
Execution
The program is executed on the virtual machine with test data from an auto-
mated test suite. The runtime analysis is based on the tool Helgrind. Results are
written to a log ﬁle.
Analysis
The log ﬁle is analyzed by the user in order to verify if the reported possible
data race are in fact data races, and if they are, corrections to the program are
made.
A. Mühlenfeld, F. Wotawa / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 174 (2007) 5–22 13
3.3 Setup and Environment
SIP Proxy Server
All experiments are carried out on a Linux x86 system. The application under
test is a signaling server application for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) that
is used for Voice-over-IP (VoIP) phone networks and utilizes POSIX-Threads for
multi-threading and synchronization primitives.
The concurrent pattern in use is ”thread-per-request”, i.e., for each request a
new thread is created. This ﬁts well into the thread-segment improvement from
VisualThreads, because the ownership is passed to the worker thread by thread
creation. Although, synchronization is already done by locks, it is necessary to
check the application for data races and deadlocks, as it has shown non-deterministic
failures when run with multiple threads.
The application is built from several hundred kLOC of C++ code, hence exper-
imental tools, only written as proof-of-concept, are not applicable. Furthermore,
there are no restrictions on the usage of C++ language constructs ruling out many
of these experimental tools that rely on the usage of only a subset of the C++
language (e.g., to keep the parser simple).
Instrumentation
For instrumentation, the C++-parser ELSA is used. ELSA is based on Elkhound,
a GLR-Parser generator[8]. ELSA builds an abstract syntax tree that is used for
source code analysis and annotation.
The input for the parser must be preprocessed, because external ﬁles are not
read by the parser and the parser requires all information to be included in the
source ﬁle. Hence, the instrumentation and compilation process has three stages.
First, the GNU compiler is used to preprocess the source ﬁle. Then the parser
reads the preprocessed source ﬁle and generates the annotated source ﬁle.
In the third and last step, the compiler generates object code from the annotated
source ﬁle.
This can be done in a shell script that replaces the compiler call during the
build process, making the instrumentation transparent to the build tools and the
programmer.
Since instrumentation adds only user-space calls to the VM that are, besides
a small delay, without eﬀect under normal execution, it could be done in every
build process. A drawback would be that build times are increased, because of the
additional second stage (instrumentation).
Test Bed
Debugging with data race detection requires a testing environment, preferably an
automated test suite to guarantee reliable repeatability of the test runs. The diﬃ-
culty lies in the diﬀerent timing behavior of the program under test since execution
on the virtual machine slows it down by a factor of 20-30. Therefore, in some cases
timeouts have to be adapted to the changed response times. Furthermore, the vir-
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Fig. 5. Results of the debugging process. Eight simple test cases where run with diﬀerent conﬁgurations of
the race checker. The two upper parts of a bar denote false positives, the smaller (top) part counts warnings
due to misinterpretation of the hardware bus lock, the bigger part due to accesses in the destructor of an
object.
tual machine in itself is single-threaded. Hence, adding more processors also will
not help.
In our environment, eight of eleven test cases used for the experiments on the
SIP proxy server ran without changes. The basic request patterns are delivered to
the application by an automated test suite. The main utility of this test suite is
SIPp, a tool for SIP load testing.
For data races, an on-the-ﬂy checker (Helgrind) is used. Deadlocks on Mutex
locks are detected by the application using a timeout while trying to acquire a
lock inside the lock-function. Since the race-checker also does dead-lock detection,
application level detection is not needed.
4 Results
The test-suite with eight test cases was run with three diﬀerent conﬁgurations. After
running it with the original Helgrind, the number of reported possible data races
was recorded. After inspecting individual warnings, it was clear that most of the
warnings are false positives resulting from a wrong implementation of the hardware
bus lock semantics and automatic modiﬁcations of objects on destruction. Both
cases are explained below.
A second run was done with a corrected implementation of the hardware bus
lock (HWLC), where many warnings disappeared. This run did not need source
code instrumentation.
In the third run (HWLCD+DR), the source code was annotated to mark memory
that is up to be destroyed just before the destructor is called. This further reduces
the amount of reported possible data races by more than a half in all cases (Figure 6).
Still, the number of reported data races is signiﬁcant and most of them are
real synchronization failures, but some faults form groups that stem from the same
origin. That means, it is generally a good idea to rerun the test suite after ﬁxing
a problem. Then, all warnings related to the corrected defect will disappear and
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Test case Original HWLC HWLC+DR
T1 483 448 120
T2 319 215 60
T3 252 194 49
T4 576 490 149
T5 631 547 146
T6 620 604 181
T7 327 269 115
T8 357 270 78
Fig. 6. Results of the debugging process. The numbers are number of reported “possible data race locations
under diﬀerent conﬁgurations. First, the originally implemented algorithm in Helgrind was used. Second,
corrections were made to the emulation of the hardware bus lock in Helgrind. The last column contains the
results after additionally applying source code annotations to delete operations.
do not have to be considered again. Additionally, faults possibly introduced by the
correction generate new warnings.
An issue arising when using Helgrind with the GNU C++ Standard Library
is false reporting due to the memory allocation strategy in the standard container
objects. Memory is reused internally and accesses to the reused memory regions
are reported as data races, even though the accesses are separated by freeing and
allocating, as Helgrind does not know anything about them. Fortunately, the alloca-
tion strategy of the GNU Standard C++ Library is conﬁgurable with environment
variables and this must be done prior to calling Helgrind.
4.1 True Positives
During our experiments, we found a number of real bugs in the analyzed program.
Since the application has about 500 kLOC, it is not always easy to decide whether a
reported warning is a true defect, a false warning or just a benign race. Nevertheless,
we found a lot of real defects in the program - a selection of bugs that seem to be
common is presented here.
One of the ﬁrst reported data races was in the application’s deadlock detection
code. Unfortunately, this code was not easy to change in order to remove the race
condition. Therefore, it was disabled for further experiments.
4.1.1 Initialization and Termination Order Problems
Another found error was a problem in the order of initialization, i.e., a thread is
started before parts of the data structures it uses are initialized. This error was not
directly found by the tool, but occurred due to the diﬀerent schedule when running
the program with instrumentation. In the “usual” environment, the fault would not
occur often enough to attract attention.
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map<string,DomainData∗> & ServerModulesManagerImpl::getDomainData()
{
MutexPtr mut(m pMutex); // Guard
return m DomainData;
}
Fig. 7. Unprotected attribute due to return of reference.
On program shutdown, another data-race occurred, because a data structure
was destroyed before a thread using it terminated.
4.1.2 Synchronization Problems
Simple locking sometimes results in unnoticed bugs (Figure 7). A quick glance
at the source-code reassures the programmer that everything is ﬁne. But even
though a lock is held in all methods of a class, there is a data access without
proper synchronization. For example, a method returning a reference to an attribute
instead of its contents.
In the case found in the program under test, the attribute is a map, therefore its
use should be protected by the lock. This bug requires to rewrite the function and
all functions that use it, because returning a reference to the internal data structure
prevents proper protection. To change that, the signature of the function changes
and all calls to the function also change.
4.1.3 Improper Use of System Functions
In a multi-threading environment, the use of some of the system functions is not
safe. Especially, all functions that use static data or, even worse, return a pointer
to static data are not thread-safe. The usage of some of these functions in the
application resulted in possible data races reported by the tool.
A remark on the glib-c manual page acknowledges this:
“The four functions asctime(), ctime(), gmtime() and
localtime() return a pointer to static data and hence are NOT thread-safe”
4.2 False Positives
Three kinds of false positives predominate the results. The ﬁrst two kinds described
here were already addressed by our improvements, while others still remain.
4.2.1 Destructor of Derived Classes
Helgrind reports a locking policy violation in the destructor of a few classes. These
destructors are mainly default-destructors generated by the compiler, but the im-
portant common property is that they all belong to derived classes.
When the destructor of an object is called every destructor of its parent classes
is called prior to actually releasing the memory associated with the object. The
destructor of the super-class should only see the properties of its class. Therefore,
the environment has to be changed in order to reﬂect this change in properties
and virtual method pointers. This change is done by writing to a location in the
object’s memory. The write access triggers a warning if the memory was in shared
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1 /∗! \ ﬁle stringtest .cpp
2 ∗ \ brief Test shared read−access of std :: string−objects.
3 ∗/
4
5 #include <string>
6 #include <pthread.h>
7
8 void ∗ workerThread(void ∗ arguments)
9 {
10 std :: string text = ∗(std:: string ∗)arguments;
11 return 0;
12 }
13
14 int main()
15 {
16 std :: string text(”contents”);
17
18 pthread t thread id;
19 pthread create(&thread id, 0, workerThread, &text);
20
21 sleep(1) ;
22 std :: string text copy = text; // <− reported conﬂict
23
24 void ∗ result = 0;
25 pthread join(thread id, &result);
26
27 return 0;
28 }
Fig. 8. Example for a shared object of type std::string. Strings are often implemented with reference
counting. Thus, when a string object is copied, it is sometimes necessary to modify the source object by
adding the new reference.
==19670== Possible data race writing variable at 0x1D6F9168
==19670== at 0x1D548451: std::string :: Rep:: M grab(std::allocator<char> const&, std::allocator<char> const&) (
in /usr/lib/gcc−lib/i686−pc−linux−gnu/3.3.2/libstdc++.so.5.0.5)
==19670== by 0x1D548517: std::string:: string(std :: string const&) (in /usr/lib/gcc−lib/i686−pc−linux−gnu/3.3.2/
libstdc++.so.5.0.5)
==19670== by 0x804879F: main (stringtest.cpp:22)
==19670== Address 0x1D6F9168 is 8 bytes inside a block of size 21 alloc’d by thread 1
==19670== at 0x1D4A8433: operator new(unsigned) (vg replace malloc.c:133)
==19670== by 0x1D545A98: std:: default alloc template<true, 0>::allocate(unsigned) (in /usr/lib/gcc−lib/i686−pc−
linux−gnu/3.3.2/libstdc++.so.5.0.5)
==19670== by 0x1D54B3F7: std::string:: Rep:: S create(unsigned, std :: allocator<char> const&) (in /usr/lib/gcc−lib/
i686−pc−linux−gnu/3.3.2/libstdc++.so.5.0.5)
==19670== by 0x1D54C13E: (within /usr/lib/gcc−lib/i686−pc−linux−gnu/3.3.2/libstdc++.so.5.0.5)
==19670== Previous state: shared RO, no locks
Fig. 9. Example for a warning issued by Helgrind. The source of the warning is in the GNU Standard
C++ library, the method m grab() adds a reference to a string object.
state. Nevertheless, a thread should be the single owner of an object, when the
thread deletes the object. Hence, the data race checker could set the state of its
memory to exclusive. This holds under the assumption that data is not accessed
after calling delete and thereby invoking its destructor. Actual violations of this
assumption are detected by ordinary memory checking tools that are able to detect
acesses to released memory blocks. Therefore, it is not a special case for multi-
threaded programs and could be neglected during data race detection.
4.2.2 Hardware Bus Lock
In this simple example (Figure 8), Helgrind reports a possible data race at the
assignment in Line 22.
The report is caused by the shared access to the reference counter. The operation
is protected by a hardware bus-lock, but the read accesses preceding this write are
not using the lock, therefore the lock-set is empty.
The technique not to initialize the lock-set until the ﬁrst occurrence of a write
does not help here because there already was a write to this memory location in the
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Fig. 10. In the thread-per-request pattern, accesses to the message data are separated by thread-create and
-join operations. The algorithm infers by comparing the thread segments that accesses are still exclusive
(per thread segment).
Worker thread:
Main thread: Create
Create
setup data
process data
wait
post
Fig. 11. In patterns using thread pools, accesses to the message data are separated by message put and get
operations. (post-wait) The algorithm used by Helgrind does not take into account that accesses are still
exclusive.
other thread (workerThread).
The detection algorithm does not take into account that the operations are
atomic. The read and write operations of the reference counter are atomic, because
it is an integer value and all writes are protected by a bus locking preﬁx. It is
impossible to derive that from simple observations, as the reference counter is part
of the structure that contains the data.
If Helgrind supported read-write locks, the hardware bus-lock could be emulated
as a read-write lock being held for reading in every read access and locked for writing,
when the lock preﬁx is used. This would emulate the behavior of bus-locks more
accurately and remove the spurious warning in the string class.
As already described, we implemented this correction successfully.
4.2.3 Transition of Ownership
The method used in the application is to spawn a new thread for every request.
When the amount of outstanding requests at any time becomes more than the
maximum allowed number of threads that run in parallel, the application will fail.
High performance server applications have to deal with many parallel requests
and usually work by putting all incoming request into a queue, while having a ﬁxed
number of threads (i.e. a thread pool) fetching data from the queue for processing.
That also avoids the overhead of creating and destroying a thread for each request.
Thus, for the application under test, it is planned to utilize patterns that use
thread pools in one way or the other.
This leads to the problem that the race detection algorithm will report more
false positives.
In the case of the thread-per-request pattern, accesses to the data that are passed
to the worker thread are clearly separated (cf. Figure 10).
When using thread pools the situation changes. Thread creation is done before
the data is initialized and passed to the worker thread, hence the data race detection
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algorithm reports a warning on the ﬁrst write to this data. The accesses are clearly
separated by the put and get operations on the message queue, but the algorithm
does not detect that (cf. Figure 11).
4.3 False Negatives
The introduction of states in the Eraser algorithm in combination with delayed
lock-set recording reduces the detection capabilities of the algorithm. One of its
greatest strength is the ability to report data races independent of execution order.
Suppose, one thread writes a shared location without acquiring a lock, whereas
another thread does the same, but coincidentally holds a lock during that access. If
the ﬁrst access takes place before the second one, no warning is reported, because
lock-set initialization is delayed until the access of the second thread, and on that
access a lock is held.
If a diﬀerent schedule leads to another execution order, the (possible) data race
is found and reported. But this is not guaranteed to happen in the development
environment, and may cause failures after delivering the software to the customer.
In fact, during the experiments such cases were found in the source code and
they have not been reported by the testing process. This indicates, that it should
be addressed in future enhancements of the algorithm.
4.4 Summary
The problems of the algorithm we encountered (false positives and false negatives)
fall into three categories:
• C++ implementation speciﬁc issues (Destructor). This was ﬁxed by source code
analysis.
• Hardware related interpretation (CPU lock preﬁx). After correcting the imple-
mentation of the hardware bus lock, this was ﬁxed too.
• The execution order imposed by higher level synchronization primitives was not
taken into account (false positive) or it was falsely assumed to be guaranteed
(false negative).
Higher level synchronization based on the low level constructs is a ﬁeld for further
improvements
4.5 Performance
Unlike static methods, dynamic analysis scales well for large programs. Program
length is not very important, because the main parameter for space and time com-
plexity is the length of the execution trace.
Generally, most runtime techniques can execute on-the-ﬂy or oﬄine. Both have
their advantages. On-the-ﬂy analysis usually has a signiﬁcant negative impact on
the execution speed of the analyzed program. Oﬄine analysis needs information
logging which may result in heavy memory usage. On the one hand, on-the-ﬂy
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techniques are preferred when the amount of information that otherwise had to be
logged is large. On the other hand, logging and oﬄine analysis is necessary when
runtime analysis would slow down the program to uselessness.
In our case, where each access to a memory location had to be logged, oﬄine
analysis would be almost impossible for long execution traces. Thus, the time
consumed by analysis directly reduces the execution speed of the observed program.
Furthermore, since Valgrind executes binaries on a virtual machine, even without
instrumentation program execution is slow.
Execution of the program with analysis using the presented algorithm is 20-30
times slower than when run without Helgrind. When comparing this number to
other works, where the reported slowdown by Eraser-like algorithms is around 2-3
(or even less), one has to take into account, that these results are obtained in envi-
ronments where the program is always executed on a virtual machine like the Java
VM (as in [2,12]) or Microsoft’s Common Language Runtime (as in [16]). If run on
Valgrind, the program is slowed down by a factor of 8-10 without instrumentation.
Thus, our results are comparable to previous works.
5 Conclusion
Nowadays, many implementations of on-the-ﬂy race detection algorithms exist. Un-
fortunately, most academic proof-of-concept implementations are not applicable to
real-world applications. At least, the need to cope with more than a subset of C++
is a knockout criterion, because to our knowledge no parser is freely available that
is able to generate an abstract syntax tree for the full ISO C++ language.
Furthermore, for a concrete implementation in a tool, additional criteria decide
whether it is useful or not. Usually, programmers are not willing to spend much time
on parameter tweaking or analyzing tool output. To be most useful, a tool should
not require the user to be an academic. Hence, the analyzing process must be easy
to setup and the results should contain very few if not zero false warnings. A good
example is the open source memory checker Valgrind, that is widely accepted by
programmers in diﬀerent environments because of its ease of use and the usefulness
of its output.
Our experiments with the freely available tool Helgrind (which is part of Val-
grind) showed that it is a good base for research, but generates too many false
warnings to be usable in production environments. We analyzed hundreds of warn-
ings generated by the tool for a large commercial server application. The results
contained many false positives, but we found real bugs, too. Based on our results
we made improvements to the algorithm and analyzed the consequences. That is,
we added knowledge about language speciﬁc properties to the runtime analysis by
unsupervised annotation of object delete operations in the source code.
We have shown that our improvements have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the amount
of false positives reported by the lock-set algorithm implemented in Helgrind. That
is, the correct interpretation of the hardware bus lock on the x86-architecture and
special marking of objects that are about to be destroyed. Furthermore, our im-
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provements do not complicate the debugging process much, in most cases only a
conﬁguration switch for the build process has to be set. And no manual source code
annotations are necessary.
Further improvements could have a similar impact on the detection abilities
of the data race checker, but require more eﬀort. The weaknesses with regard
to common multi-threading patterns should be addressed. Common concurrent
patterns often rely on higher level constructs for synchronization that the lock-set
algorithm is unaware of.
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